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Abstract. We analyze an economy with asymmetric information and endo-
genize the possibilities for information transmission between members of a
coalition. We then de®ne a concept of the Core that takes into account these
communication possibilities. The internal consistency of the improvements is
considered and an Internally Consistent Core, which requires credibility from
the improvements is introduced.
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1. Introduction
In his seminal paper Wilson (1978) analyzes an economy with asymmetric
information and proposes a de®nition of the Core. The di½culty raised by
economies with asymmetric information stems from two factors: ®rst, agents
evaluate bundles after they have received their information, and secondly, not
all of them have the same information. If agents evaluated bundles before
their private information is revealed to them or, if all agents received the same
information, we would face a special case of Arrow-Debreu economies and
need no new de®nition of the Core. Wilson (1978) notes that when informa-
tion is asymmetric, it is not enough for each member of a coalition to know
that he prefers one allocation over another in order for a coalition to improve
upon the latter. It must be commonly known by all members of the coalition
that this is so. The requirement that the improvement be common knowledge
is needed because agents necessarily learn that they are improving upon an
* I thank Darin Lee, Roberto Serrano, Rajiv Vohra and especially Nir Dagan and Ronel Elul for
illuminating discussions.allocation when they are doing so, and they must still be willing to transact
after they have learned whatever they have learned. The important question
is: With respect to what information structure should an improvement be
common knowledge?
When there are no opportunities for communication, the proper response
to the question above is: with respect to the agents' initial information. For
if there is no information transmission, the agents cannot re®ne their initial
information and consequently, a coalition can improve upon an allocation
only if it is self-evident that they can enforce something better. Wilson's
Coarse Core takes these circumstances into account. When opportunities for
communication are allowed, on the other hand, the relevant information is the
initial information re®ned by the information transmission that has taken
place. Wilson's Fine Core takes this into account and allows for unlimited
communication among agents.
The possibilities of communication are exogenously given in the de®nition
of both the Coarse and the Fine core. In this paper we want to make the
information transmission endogenous. The idea is that while it may not be
common knowledge that a given allocation is strictly preferred by the mem-
bers of some coalition, it may become common knowledge after all of them
express their willingness to trade. That is, if agents are allowed to repeatedly
express their willingness to carry out a trade, the common desirability of one
allocation over another may become common knowledge. The information
transmission is endogenous because it follows from the comparison of two
given allocations, and di¨erent allocations will give rise to di¨erent informa-
tion transmissions. The way the information is transmitted and common
knowledge is thus achieved, is similar to the processes by which posteriors
converge in Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1982) and in Bacharach
(1985).1 When we allow for the kind of endogenous information transmission
described above, we are lead to a de®nition of the Core that is intermediate
between the Coarse Core and the Fine Core.
As Wilson (1978) notes, the opportunities for communication may disrupt
arrangements for mutual insurance, resulting in the emptiness of the Core.
This is true for both the Fine Core and for our Core with endogenous com-
munication. But there is another disruption that the opportunities for com-
munication may cause, and it is related to the credibility of the improvements.
Speci®cally, there are allocations outside the Core with communication that
cannot be improved upon in a credible way. Namely, whenever they are
improved upon by a coalition S by means of an allocation y and after some
information transmission has taken place, there is a subcoalition of S that can
use its new information and improve upon y by means of some other assign-
ment of bundles z. This problem raises the question of what the allocations
that cannot be improved upon in an internally consistent way are. When the
sort of endogenous information transmission described above is allowed, the
answer is what we call the Internally Consistent Core.
The Internally Consistent Core clearly contains the Core with endogenous
communication, but there is no inclusion relation with the Coarse Core. The
fact that it is not a subset of the Coarse Core may be surprising at ®rst sight,
1 See also Sebenius and Geanakoplos (1983), and Hart and Tauman (1996) for an economic
application.
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allocation y that is commonly known to be strictly preferred to another allo-
cation x when they are evaluated with the initial information may not be
credible, because a subcoalition may improve upon the former using some
communication which may be insu½cient to improve upon the latter.
Although the Coarse Core, the Core with communication, and the Inter-
nally Consistent Core are di¨erent concepts, the improvements on which they
are based essentially coincide when we restrict attention to the grand coalition
and to one-person coalitions. This allows us to prove a modi®ed version of the
No Trade Theorem (see Milgrom and Stokey (1982) for an early version of
the theorem).
In this paper, as in Wilson (1978), we abstract from incentive problems.
Implicit in the de®nition of an allocation is the assumption that the states are
veri®able. We do this because we want to focus on the topic of endogenous
information transmission and the appropriate concept of improvements. For a
paper that takes into account incentive problems and thus restricts attention
to the allocations that are incentive compatible, see Vohra (1999). A more
related paper is Dutta and Vohra (1997) which, while restricting attention to
incentive compatible allocations, attempts to endogenize the information
transmission. Holmstrom and Myerson (1983) and Krasa (1999) deal with
endogenous communication, but they restrict attention to the grand coalition.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model of an
economy with asymmetric information and the allocations that we consider.
Section 3 discusses several notions of improving allocations, which di¨er
only in the communication possibilities they allow. When the transmission of
information is endogenous, the corresponding notion of improving allocations
gives rise to the Core with endogenous communication. After noting that some
improvements with endogenous communication may not be internally con-
sistent, Section 4 uses the Core with endogenous communication as a building
block to de®ne the Internally Consistent Core, which is the main concept of
the paper. The central message of the paper is conveyed in Example 3, which
shows that belonging to the Coarse Core is not a necessary condition for sta-
bility when endogenous communication is allowed.
2. Economies
Let W be a ®nite set with generic element o. The set W represents the set of
possible states of the world, and o represents one such state. Subsets of W are
called events. A commodity vector is an element of Rl
.Abundle is a function
xi : W ! Rl
 that assigns a commodity vector to each state of the world. We
denote the set of bundles by B.A nagent i is a fourtuple (Pi;ui;ei;mi) where
Pi is a partition of W that represents i's information
ui : Rl
  W ! R is agent i's state contingent utility function
ei : W ! Rl
 is agent i's state contingent initial endowment of commodities
mi is a strictly positive probability measure on W that represents agent i's prior
beliefs.
For each partition P of W, we denote by Po the element of P that
contains o. For each bundle xi A B we denote by uixi the function uixi :
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R be a bundle. Agent i's conditional expected utility of xi relative to Pi is the
function EmiuixijPi : W ! R that assigns to each state o, agent i's condi-
tional expectation of uixi given the event Pio, namely
EmiuixijPioEmiuixijPio:
De®nition 1. An economy with asymmetric information E 
hN;Pi;ui;ei;miiANi, is a ®nite collection of agents.
Non-empty subsets of N are called coalitions.
De®nition 2. Let S be a coalition. An information structure for S is a collection
PiiAS of partitions of W, one partition for each agent in S.
Information structures for N are called simply information structures.
Let PiiAS be an information structure for S. The meet of the partitions
PiiAS is the ®nest partition of W that is coarser than each Pi, i A S, and
it is denoted by PS  5iAS Pi. Similarly, the join of the partitions PiiAS
is the coarsest partition that is ®ner than each Pi, i A S and is denoted by
4iAS Pi. An event E is said to be common knowledge among the members
of S at o with respect to information structure PiiAS if PSoJE.I f
an information structure is not speci®ed, it should be understood that we
mean the initial information partitions Pi. The formal de®nition of common
knowledge was ®rst introduced by Aumann (1976).
De®nition 3. Let S be a coalition. An assignment of bundles to agents in Si s
a function y : S ! B.
De®nition 4. Let E  hN;Pi;ui;ei;miiANi be an economy and let S be a






S-allocations represent all those redistributions of their endowments that
coalition S can carry out without the consent of others. N-allocations are
simply called allocations. Denote the set of all S-allocations by AS and the
set of allocations by A.I fy is an assignment of bundles to agents in S and
T JS, we shall write yT for the projection of y on T and, with a slight abuse
of notation, yi for yi.
De®nition 5. Let E  hN;Pi;ui;ei;miiANi be an economy. We say that allo-
cation x is individually rational if
EmiuixijPiVEmiuieijPi Ei A N:
De®nition 6. Let E  hN;Pi;ui;ei;miiANi be an economy. We say that allo-
cation x is strictly e½cient if there is no allocation y A A and no state o A W
such that
EmiuiyijPioVEmiuixijPio Eo A PNo; Ei A N;
with strict inequality at o for some i A N.
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state o A W such that
EmiuiyijPioVEmiuixijPio Eo A PNo; Ei A N
with strict inequality at o for all i A N.
We say that allocation x is weakly e½cient if there is no allocation y A A
and no state o A W such that
EmiuiyijPio > EmiuixijPio Eo A PNo; Ei A N:
A standard argument shows that when preferences are continuous and
strictly monotonic at every state of the world the concepts of strict e½ciency
and e½ciency coincide. Weak e½ciency, however, is not identical to e½ciency
even when agents' preferences are continuous and strictly monotonic at every
state of the world as the following example demonstrates.
Example 1. Consider the following two-agent two-state economy with a com-
mon prior given by m  1
2; 1
2. The agents' utility functions are constant across
states and given by uia;bab, for i  1;2. The initial endowments and
information partitions are described in the following table, which also con-
tains a feasible allocation y.
Endowment e Allocation y
Agent Pi o1 o2 o1 o2
1 ffo1g;fo2gg 1;1 2;0 1;1 1;1
2 ffo1;o2gg 0;0 0;2 0;0 1;1
The initial endowment is not an e½cient allocation because allocation y
dominates it: both agents are better o¨ at state o2 without being hurt at state
o1. On the other hand the initial endowment is weakly e½cient because it is
impossible to make agent 1 better o¨ in state o1.
A su½cient condition for the three e½ciency concepts to coincide is that
the agents' preferences be continuous and strictly monotonic at every state of
the world and that the agents's consumption sets be open subsets of Rl
. For
in this case, if one agent can be made better o¨ at one state, say o, without
hurting anybody at any state in PNo, then it is possible to design a system of
transfers that makes everybody better o¨ at every sate in PNo.
The existence of individually rational and strictly e½cient allocations is
guaranteed if the individuals' utility functions are continuous (see Wilson
(1978) for details).
3. Improvements
In this section we present several ways ± which di¨er in the degree of com-
munication allowed ± a coalition can improve upon an allocation. The ®rst
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agents. In order for a coalition to improve upon an allocation it must be
common knowledge among the members of the coalition, with respect to their
initial information partitions, that they can enforce an S-allocation that is
strictly preferred by all of them.
De®nition 7. Let T be a coalition, let x be an assignment of bundles to agents in
T, and let PiiAT be an information structure for T. Let S JT be another
coalition. We say that S-allocation y A AS is a coarse improvement of S upon
x with respect to information structure PiiAT at o if
EmiuiyijPio > EmiuixijPio Ei A S; Eo A PSo:
When y is a coarse improvement of S upon x with respect to PiiAT at
some o A W, we say that x is improved upon by S with respect to PiiAT.
Associated with the notion of coarse improvements, we have the de®nition
of the Coarse Core.
De®nition 8. The Coarse Core of the economy E with respect to information
structure PiiAN is the set of its allocations that cannot be improved upon with
respect to PiiAN by any coalition.
The Coarse Core of the economy E with respect to information structure
PiiAN is simply called the Coarse Core of E.
The second notion is appropriate when agents have unlimited communi-
cation possibilities. By unlimited communication possibilities we mean that
each coalition has a set of feasible communication systems at its disposal (see
Wilson (1978), Section 3), which is rich enough to enable the coalition to use
any of the information structures between the initial one and the coarsest
common re®nement of the initial one.
De®nition 9. Let E  hN;Pi;ui;ei;miiANi be an economy and let x be an
allocation in it. We say that S-allocation y is a ®ne improvement of S upon x
if there is an information structure PkkAS for S such that
for all i A S, Pi is not coarser than Pi
for all i A S, Pi is not ®ner than 4kAS Pk
and with respect to which y is a coarse improvement of S upon xS.
Associated with ®ne improvements, we have the notion of the Fine Core,
found in Wilson (1978).
De®nition 10. The Fine Core of the economy E is the set of all its allocations
that cannot be ®nely improved upon by any coalition.
We want to introduce a notion of improvement, that allows for some, but
not unlimited, communication. To understand our notion, note that in order
for an S-allocation y to be a coarse improvement upon x, it must be common
knowledge without communication that y is strictly preferred to x by all
agents in S. Also, in order for y to be a ®ne improvement upon x, it should
68 O. Volijbe possible to redistribute the information initially held by the members of the
coalition in such a way that no one learns more than what can be learned by
pooling all the information, no one forgets what he knows, and ®nally, in such
a way that makes it common knowledge that y is strictly preferred to x. Our
notion lies somewhere in the middle since it does not allow unlimited infor-
mation transmission. We allow only the transmission of information that
takes place when the agents repeatedly agree to carry out the transaction. The
fact that y is strictly preferred to x by all members of S should become com-
mon knowledge after a long handshake during which the agents ratify their
willingness to take y instead of x. Only after this long handshake can we say
that it became common knowledge that y is better than x. In order to for-
malize the idea we need a piece of notation.
Let f and g be two functions on W. We denote the event at which f > g by
 f > g. Namely,
 f > gf w A W : fw > gwg:
Similarly  f Ugf > g
c. Also, we denote by Pf > g the partition gen-
erated by  f > g, namely
Pf > gf f > g; f Ugg:
De®nition 11. Let T be a coalition, let x be an assignment of bundles to agents in
T, let PiiAT be an information structure for T, and let S JT be a coalition.
Let y AAS be an S-allocation and de®ne the information structures for S,
P S
i niAS, for n  0;1;2;...; recursively as follows:
P S
i 0Pi Ei A S;
for n A N,
P S

















We say that hy;P S
i iASi is an improvement of S upon hx;PiiATi at o A
W if
EmiuiyijP S
i no > EmiuixijP S
i no Ei A S; En A N:
When hy;P S
i iASi is an improvement of S upon hx;PiiANi at some o,
we say that hx;PiiANi is improved upon by S.
Implicit in the above de®nition is a ``dialogue'' in the sense of Bacharach
(1985). In this dialogue agents repeatedly communicate their willingness to
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i iASi to be an improvement of S upon
hx;PiiANi at o, the following should hold:
1. All agents in S should prefer y to x at o when they evaluate these assign-
ments according to the information structure Pi
2. All agents in S should prefer y to x at o when they evaluate these assign-
ments according to the information structure that results from the re®ne-
ment of Pi with the information that all the previous items hold
3. The same as above, and so on ad in®nitum.
Note that in order for y to be part of an improvement upon x, it must be
the case that the agents prefer y to x during the whole dialogue. An alternative
de®nition would require only that the agents prefer y to x in the limit, that is,
independently of the answers along the dialogue.
Clearly, since the individual partitions are assumed to be ®nite, the re®ne-
ment process just described ends after a ®nite number of rounds. More for-
mally, by the de®nition of the partitions P S
i n, the sequence fP S
i ngnAN is
non-decreasing. Since the state space is ®nite, there must be a step M A N such
that for all n > M we have P S
i nP S
i n  1 for all i A S. This shows that
the partitions P S
i are well-de®ned and satisfy
P S








Remark 1. Assume hy;P S
i iASi is an improvement of S upon hx;PiiANi
at some o, then y is a coarse improvement of S upon xS with respect to the
information structure P S
i iAS. Namely, it became common knowledge
among the members of S that x is strictly preferred to y.
Proof: Since hy;P S
i iASi is an improvement upon hx;PiiASi at o we have
EmiuiyijP S
i no > EmiuixijP S
i no Ei A S En A N:
Since P S
i nP S
i for some n A N we have
EmiuiyijP S
i o > EmiuixijP S
i o Ei A S:





k  > EmkukxkjP S






k  > EmkukxkjP S
k 
which means that it is common knowledge with respect to P S
k k AS at o that
all members of S prefer y to xS. r
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i iASi is an improve-
ment of S upon hx;PiiANi at some o,t h e nit can become common knowl-
edge among the members of S that x is strictly preferred to y.
In order to understand the de®nition of an improvement, consider the fol-
lowing example.
Example 2. Consider the following three-agent four-state economy with a




4. The agents' utility functions are con-
stant across states and given by uia;bab, for i  1;2;3. The initial en-
dowments and information partitions are described in the following table,
which also contains a feasible allocation y.
Endowment e Allocation y
Agent Pi o1 o2 o3 o4 o1 o2 o3 o4
1 ffo1;o2;o3g;fo4gg 2;0 1;1 0;0 1;1 1;1 1;1 0;0 0;1
2 ffo1;o2g;fo3;o4gg 1;0 0;0 1;1 0;1 1;1 1;1 0;0 1;2
3 ffo1g;fo2;o3;o4gg 0;3 1;1 0;1 0;1 1;1 0;0 1;2 0;0
The expected utilities of each agent, derived from the above allocations,
are given by:
o1 o2 o3 o4
Eu1e1jP1f 1=31 =31 =3gf 1g
Eu1y1jP1f 2=32 =32 =3gf 0g
Eu2e2jP2f 00 gf 1=21 =2g
Eu2y2jP2f 11 gf 11 g
Eu3e3jP3f 0gf 1=31 =31 =3g
Eu3y3jP3f 1gf 2=32 =32 =3g
At no state of the world is it common knowledge that all agents prefer the
assignment y to the assignment e, because at state o4 agent 1 strictly prefers x
to y. Consequently, y is not a coarse improvement of N upon the endowment.
Assume, however, that the true state is o1. At this state all three agents
prefer y to x. Since this is true for all states except for o4, it becomes common
knowledge, after y has not been rejected by any agent, that state o4 is not the
true state.




and the corresponding new expected utilities for each agent:
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Eu1x1jP11 f1=31 =31 =3gf 1g
Eu1y1jP11 f2=32 =32 =3gf 0g
Eu2x1jP21 f00 gf 1gf 0g
Eu2y2jP21 f11 gf 0gf 2g
Eu3x3jP31 f0gf 1=21 =2gf 0g
Eu3y3jP31 f1gf 11 gf 0g
Note that all agents prefer y to x except for agent 2 at state o3 (o4 is
irrelevant at this stage, since it became common knowledge that it did not
occur). Consequently, it becomes apparent at this stage (do not forget that we





The corresponding expected utilities, with respect to the updated informa-
tion structure is given by:
o1 o2 o3 o4
Eu1x1jP12 f1=21 =2gf 0gf 1g
Eu1y1jP12 f11 gf 0gf 0g
Eu2x2jP22 f00 gf 1gf 0g
Eu2y2jP22 f11 gf 0gf 2g
Eu3x3jP32 f0gf 1gf 0gf 0g
Eu3y3jP32 f1gf 0gf 2gf 0g
At this point it becomes common knowledge that the true state is o1,
because if the true state were o2, agent 3 would prefer x to y, while at o1
all three agents prefer y to x. We can conclude that:
Allocation y together with the limit information structure
Pi3f f o1g;fo2g;fo3g;fo4gg; i  1;2;3
is an improvement of N upon hx;PiiANi.
The above de®nition of an improvement leads to the following de®nition
of a core with endogenous communication.
De®nition 12. The Core with endogenous communication, or simply the Core,
of E is the set of all allocations x A A, such that hx;PiiANi is not improved
upon by any coalition.
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surprising.
Proposition 1. The core of an economy is a subset of its Coarse Core.
Proof: Assume that x is an allocation that is not in the Coarse Core of the
economy. Then there exists an S-allocation y and a state o at which it is
common knowledge among the members of S that y is preferred to x by
each of them. But then hy;PiiASi is an improvement of S upon hx;PiiASi
at o, since nothing can be learned from the fact that all agents strictly prefer
y to x. r
Proposition 2. The Fine Core of an economy is a subset of its Core.
Proof: Let E be an economy with set of agents N. Assume that allocation x
is not in the Core of E. This means that there is a coalition S JN with an
improvement upon hx;PiiANi. Let hy;P S
i iASi be that improvement. This
means that y coarsely improves upon xS with respect to P S
i iAS. Moreover,
by construction, for all i A S, P S
i is not coarser than Pi and not ®ner than
4kAS Pk. Consequently y is a ®ne improvement upon x. r
4. Internally consistent improvements
A question that has been asked in the context of perfect information is
whether the S-allocations that are used to improve upon other allocations are
themselves immune to deviations of some of the members of S. Improvements
that are immune to internal deviations are internally consistent.2 Ray (1989)
showed that in the context of perfect information, it is always possible to ®nd
internally consistent improvements upon allocations that are not in the Core.
In this section we want to answer the same question but for the context of
economies with asymmetric information. As we shall see, Ray's result still
holds, as long as there is no communication. As soon as communication is
allowed, we'll be able to ®nd allocations outside the core that are not im-
proved upon by any internally consistent improvement.
De®nition 13. Let x A AT be a T-allocation, let PiiAT be an information
structure, and let S JT be a coalition. We say that y A AS is an internally
consistent coarse improvement of S upon x with respect to PiiAT at o A W
. when jSj1, if y is a coarse improvement upon x with respect to PiiAT at
o
. when jSj > 1, if y is a coarse improvement upon x with respect to PiiAT at
o such that there is no coalition FPS with an internally consistent coarse
improvement upon y with respect to PiiAS at o.
The following result is the extension of Ray (1989) to economies with
asymmetric information.
2 The idea of internally consistent improvements is related to the non-cooperative solution con-
cept of Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibrium de®ned in Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston (1987).
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allocation in it and let PiiAN be an information structure. The following
statements are equivalent:
i. There is a coalition with a coarse improvement upon x with respect to
PiiAN
ii. There is a coalition with an internally consistent coarse improvement upon x
with respect to PiiAN.
Proof:
i ! ii. Assume there is a coalition S JN with a coarse improvement upon x
at some o. Namely, there is an S-allocation y and event PSo A
5kAS Pk such that EuiyijPio > EuixijPio for all o A
PSo, for all i A S.I fy is an internally consistent coarse improve-
ment of S upon x at o, we are done. So assume that there is a coali-
tion T PS and an internally consistent coarse improvement z of T
upon y at o. Namely there is a T-allocation z and an event PTo A
5kATPk such that EuizijPio > EuiyijPio for all o A
PTo and for all i A T. But then, since PToJPSo, we have
that EuizijPio > EuixijPio for all o A PTo and for all
i A T, which means that z is an internally consistent coarse improve-
ment of T upon x as well.
ii ! i. An internally consistent coarse improvement is, in particular, a coarse
improvement. r
Next we want to extend the notion of internal consistency to the improve-
ments that de®ne the Core with endogenous communication.
De®nition 14. Let x A AT be a T-allocation, let PiiAT be an information
structure, and let S JT be a coalition. We say that hy;P S
i iASi is an inter-
nally consistent improvement of S upon hx;PiiATi at o A W
. when jSj1, if hy;P S
i iASi is an improvement upon hx;PiATi at o
. when jSj > 1, if hy;P S
i iASi is an improvement upon hx;PiANi at o such
that there is no coalition FPS with an internally consistent improvement
upon hy;P S
i iASi at o.
When hy;P S
i iASi is an internally consistent improvement of S upon
hx;PiiANi at some o, we say that x is improved upon by S in an internally
consistent way.
De®nition 15. The Internally Consistent Core of E is the set of all allocations
x A A such that hx;PiiANi is not improved upon by any coalition in an
internally consistent way.
The following proposition shows that the previous de®nition is not super-
¯uous.
Proposition 3. The Core of an economy is a subset of its Internally Consistent
Core and the reverse inclusion does not necessarily hold.
74 O. VolijProof: Since an internally consistent improvement is also an improvement, it
is clear that the Core is a subset of the Internally Consistent Core. To see that
the reverse inclusion does not necessarily hold, consider the following econ-
omy, taken from Wilson (1978). There are three agents, each with the same




. There is a common
prior given by the uniform distribution over the states space. Consider allo-
cation x in the next table
Endowment e Allocation x




Allocation x is not in the Core because coalition S f 1;2g has an im-





i State o1 o2 o3
1 ffo1g;fo2;o3gg 5.5 0 0
2 ffo2g;fo1g;fo3gg 2.5 6 4
The improvement hy;P S
i iASi is not internally consistent since it is im-
proved upon by agent 2 at o1 in an internally consistent way by means of his
own endowment.
The same kind of argument can be made for every improvement upon
hx;PiiANi. This shows that x belongs to the Internally Consistent Core of
the economy.3 r
The above example gives evidence of the superiority of the Internally
Consistent Core over the Core. The economy has an empty Core, but the im-
provements that disqualify allocation x are not credible. In any case, the pre-
vious result raises the question of what is the appropriate concept of the core
when communication is allowed.4 Fortunately, however, the basic concepts of
individual rationality and e½ciency are not seriously in¯uenced by the possi-
bility of communication as the following propositions show.
3 Note that allocation x belongs to the Coarse Core too.
4 The fact that allocations outside the Core are not improved upon in an internally consistent way
is not due to special manner the information is transmitted. It follows from the fact that there is
communication.
Communication, credible improvements and the core of an economy 75Proposition 4. The following statements are equivalent:
i. Allocation x is individually rational
ii. There is no agent with an improvement upon x
iii. There is no agent with an internally consistent improvement upon x.
Proof: Trivial r
Proposition 5. The following statements hold for all allocations x:
i. If x is e½cient then the grand coalition does not have an improvement upon
x;
ii. If the grand coalition does not have an improvement upon x then the grand
coalition does not have an internally consistent improvement upon x;
iii. If the grand coalition does not have an improvement upon x then x is weakly
e½cient.
Proof:
i. If hy;PiiANi is an improvement of N upon hx;PiiANi, then by
Remark 1 there is some information structure PiiAN, ®ner than PiiAN,
with respect to which it becomes common knowledge at some o that
everybody prefers y to x. In other words,
EmiuiyijPio > EmiuixijPio Ei A N Eo A PNo:
De®ne the allocation z by
zio
yio if o A PNo
xio otherwise

It is not di½cult to see that z dominates x and as a result x cannot be
e½cient.
ii. If there is no improvement, you will never ®nd an internally consistent
one.
iii. Assume that x is not a weakly e½cient allocation. Then there is an allo-
cation y and state o at which it is common knowledge that y is better
than x in the eyes of all the agents. But this implies that y is an improve-
ment of the grand coalition upon x. r
Since when the agents' utility functions are continuous and strictly increa-
sing at every state of the world, and when their consumption sets are open
subsets of Rl
 the concepts of e½ciency and weak e½ciency are equivalent, it
follows from Proposition 5 that an allocation is e½cient if and only if the
grand coalition does not have an improvement upon it. In other words, in this
case the standard concept of e½ciency remains valid even after enabling
agents to communicate.
76 O. VolijCorollary 1. Let E be a two person economy where agents have continuous
utility functions. The Internally Consistent Core is a nonempty subset of the
Coarse Core.
Proof: It follows from Propositions 4 and 5 and from the existence of indi-
vidually rational and e½cient allocations. r
Corollary 2. (Modi®ed No-Trade Theorem) Assume x is an e½cient allocation.
Then there is no allocation y that can become commonly known to be strictly
preferred to x by all agents.
Proof: Since x is e½cient, by Proposition 5 there is no allocation y and state o
at which it can become common knowledge that y is preferred to x by all
agents. r
The well-known No-Trade Theorem (see Milgrom and Stokey (1982),
Holmstrom and Myerson (1983) or Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1990) for
di¨erent versions) states that if an allocation is ex-ante e½cient, it must be
(interim) e½cient as well. The interpretation is that if the agents traded in
contingent commodities before they get their private information, and they
reached an ex-ante e½cient allocation, then after they get their private infor-
mation, from wherever it may come, it is impossible to ®nd a reallocation that
is commonly known to be preferred by all agents. Our modi®ed no-trade the-
orem is di¨erent in that the starting point is a stage at which the individuals
already got their private information and in that some information transmis-
sion is allowed. Our theorem says that if the allocation is (interim) e½cient
(and not necessarily ex-ante e½cient), it is impossible for the agents to ®nd an
allocation that, even after some dialogue takes place, becomes common
knowledge to be strictly preferred to the former. Not only is new information
incapable of inducing trade, but endogenous communication between the
asymmetrically informed agents is incapable as well.
Corollary 1 shows that for two-person economies, the Internally Consis-
tent Core is a subset of the Coarse Core. In general, however, there is no in-
clusion relation whatsoever, as the following example shows.
Example 3. Consider the following economy with three agents, two commod-
















Agent Pi o1 o2 o3 o4
1 ffo1;o4g;fo2;o3gg 5;0 7;0 5;0 7;0
2 ffo1;o2g;fo3;o4gg 0;5 0;7 0;5 0;7
3 ffo1;o2;o3;o4gg 2;2 0;0 2;2 0;0
The endowment e is not in the Coarse Core because the allocation y below
is commonly known (at every state) to be strictly preferred to e by all agents.
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Agent Pi o1 o2 o3 o4
1 ffo1;o4g;fo2;o3gg 6;0 6;0 6;0 6;0
2 ffo1;o2g;fo3;o4gg 0;6 0;6 0;6 0;6
3 ffo1;o2;o3;o4gg 1;1 1;1 1;1 1;1
Moreover, it can be checked that y belongs to the Coarse Core. Allocation
y, however, does not form part of an internally consistent improvement upon
e because coalition S f 1;2g has the following internally consistent im-
provement upon it at o2.
Allocation z
Agent P S
i o1 o2 o3 o4
1 ffo1g;fo2g;fo3g;fo4gg 3;0 7;0 5;2 7;0
2 ffo1g;fo2g;fo3g;fo4gg 2;5 0;7 0;3 0;7
To see this, note that if o2 is the true state of the world, both agents prefer
z to y (z provides them with an expected utility of 7). Since o2 is the only state
at which both agents prefer z to y, they learn from their mutual agreement
that the state is indeed o2, and it becomes common knowledge that z is pre-
ferred to y by both of them. Moreover, z is a ``credible'' S-allocation because
it cannot be improved upon by any singleton at o2. What happens is that,
even though allocation y is very attractive, agent 3 fears that at o2 it will be-
come common knowledge between agents 1 and 2 that they can run away with
7 units each, leaving agent 3 in the cold. This justi®ed fear is what destabilizes
allocation y. Agent 3 does not give in to the alluring powers of allocation y
and rejects it.
Consequently, y is not in the Internally Consistent Core. This shows that
the Coarse Core is not a subset of the Internally Consistent Core. On the other
hand, allocation z does not form part of an internally consistent improvement
upon e. Moreover, the initial endowment belongs to the Internally Consistent
Core. To see this, note that no pair of agents that contains agent 3 can im-
prove upon the endowment since no agent can individually increase agent's 3
utility. It is not di½cult to check that agents 1 and 2 cannot ®nd an improve-
ment upon the endowment. And ®nally all the improvements of the grand
coalition are not internally consistent because an internally consistent im-
provement upon them similar to the one in the example can be found. This
shows that the Internally Consistent Core is not a subset of the Coarse Core.
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